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1 Introduction
This paper considers the allocation of indivisible durable goods through decentralized trading
processes. A simple example is the allocation of N offices among N students. Even if the size of
the problem, N , is relatively small, the number of possible allocations can be quite large. With ten
students and offices, the number of allocations is about 3.6 million. When there are other goods
to be allocated besides offices (such as parking permits), the problem of finding efficient allocations
becomes even more complex. We examine how successful decentralized trading processes are in
solving those complex combinatorial problems.
We consider a situation where agents randomly meet over time. When a group of agents
meet, they exchange their goods in the following simple way. First, a new allocation for them is
randomly proposed, and it is accepted if it provides a higher utility for all of them. Otherwise,
the agents continue to hold their endowments. When they assess the proposed allocation, we
assume that their utility is subject to random shocks. The shocks can be interpreted as mistakes,
or temporal changes in tastes. Alternatively, the shocks may represent speculation based on
“animal spirits,” that is, an agent may accept a bad bundle of goods for him, betting that it will
be exchanged for a better bundle in the future.1
Incorporating random terms in utility functions has been found to be quite useful in economet-
ric studies of discrete choice problems (such as the choice of occupation or means of transportation),
and we employ one of the leading specifications in econometrics, the logit model, for the distribu-
tion of the noise term. Thanks to the special structure of the model, we obtain the closed form
solution of the stationary distribution, for any level of noise. This is in contrast to the tradi-
tional stochastic stability methodology, first introduced to economics and game theory in Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). The method identifies those states —allocations— in
which the economy spends most of its time in the long run, when the noise in the system is made
negligible. Negligible noise implies a fairly long waiting time to see the long run effects, and this
begs the question about the relevance of the model. The present paper, in contrast, allows us
to analyze the case where the noise level is reasonably large, so that the stationary distribution
1Our “animal spirits” interpretation is that agents do not always hold rational expectations about the future
course of exchange.
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provides useful predictions over an economically relevant time horizon. It turns out that in our
model, the selected states under vanishing noise remain to be the most likely states in the station-
ary distribution, for any level of noise. Specifically, we show that, for any level of noise, the states
that maximize a weighted sum of the agents’ intrinsic utilities receive the largest probability in
the stationary distribution and, as the randomness vanishes, the limiting stationary distribution
assigns probability one to such states.
Our result sheds light on the previous contribution by Ben-Shoham, Serrano and Volij (2004).
They considered house allocation problems and found that, with vanishing noise, the minimum
envy allocation is selected when serious mistakes are less likely. An agent’s envy level is the
number of other agents who have better houses, and the minimum envy allocation is the one that
minimizes the aggregate envy level. We show that this somewhat mysterious result can be derived
from a more general principle, namely, that evolutionary dynamics with logit noise maximize the
aggregate utility level (see Section 4 for the details).
Note that our results imply, in particular, that the most likely state is efficient. One may
think that the fact that the trading process reaches an efficient state is not surprising because
agents agree to trade only if their payoffs increase. The important point to note, however, is that
with no noise the process may be stuck on an inefficient state. For example, when only bilateral
trades are possible, this will happen once the economy reaches an inefficient state where there is
no double coincidence of wants.2 In this respect, decentralized trading processes for indivisible
goods resemble the algorithms that are used to solve combinatorial optimization problems with
multiple local maxima, where the process may get stuck at one of them. For this, it has been
found that random search algorithms, notably the ones based on simulated annealing methods
(see Aarts and Korst (1989)) are quite effective. Since stochastic evolutionary game theory relies
on the same basic idea as simulated annealing, its application to the allocation of indivisible goods
should be particularly fruitful. Just like randomness in simulated annealing helps to escape from
a local maximum, so does randomness in utility ensure that our trading process is not stuck at an
inefficient state.
2Ben-Shoham, Serrano and Volij (2004) showed that an inefficient state can be stochastically stable, when all
mistakes are equally likely. Hence adding noise does not always help escape from an inefficient state. Our model
provides a set of sufficient conditions for the noise term to knock out inefficient states.
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Our result is obtained for barter economies, but we also study exchange of goods with monetary
transfers. It turns out that our assumption on the noise term and the quasi-linearity of utility
in money allows us to extend the same techniques to this case, thereby yielding a similar result.
This may be of independent interest: despite money being a continuous variable in the model, we
are able to use the methods and framework developed mostly for discrete variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the dynamic model for discrete barter
economies, and Section 3 introduces money. The final section discusses related literature.
2 Decentralized Barter: Exchange Economies
There are K durable and indivisible commodities in the economy. The set of agents is N =
{1, . . . , I}. Agent i’s consumption set is Xi ⊂ {0, 1, 2, ...}K . This allows for the possibility that
an agent consumes an arbitrary number of units of each good, as in general exchange economies,
or only one unit of one of the goods and zero of the others, as in house allocation problems.
At time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , } agent i holds a bundle of commodities denoted by zi(t). Although the
individuals’ holdings may change over time, the aggregate endowment of goods remains fixed, i.e.P
i∈N zi(t) = z. A coalition is a non-empty subset of agents. For any coalition S ⊂ N , a feasible
allocation for S at time t is a distribution of their endowments at t. Thus, the set of feasible
allocations for S at t is
AS(zS(t)) = {z0S ∈ ×i∈SXi |
X
i∈S
z0i =
X
i∈S
zi(t)}
and in particular, the set of feasible allocations in the economy is given by
Z = AN(z) = {z0N ∈ ×i∈NXi |
X
i∈N
z0i = z}.
There is an exogenously given set of allowable coalitions, denoted S ⊂ 2N that may meet and
trade in each period. For example, when only pairwise meetings are possible (a particular case
of our model), we have S = {S ⊂ N | |S| = 2}. At period t = 1, 2, . . . a coalition S ∈ S is
selected with probability q(S) > 0 (independent of time), and has the opportunity to reallocate
their holdings of commodities. We assume that from any initial feasible allocation z, any feasible
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allocation z0 can be reached through a series of feasible proposals by a finite sequence of allowable
coalitions S1, . . . , ST ∈ S.
Suppose that, in the current period, a coalition S ∈ S is selected, and let zS ≡ zS(t) be the
allocation of goods for this coalition at the beginning of the current period. A new allocation for
this coalition is chosen according to a probability distribution, which may depend on the current
allocation, over the set of feasible allocations AS(zS). We assume that there is certain symmetry
in the proposal distribution.
Assumption 1 For any zS , z0S ∈ AS(·), the probability that allocation z0S is chosen when the
current allocation is zS is the same as the probability that allocation zS is chosen when the
current allocation is z0S.
There are some instances where this requirement is naturally satisfied. For example, this
assumption holds when proposals are completely random (a new allocation is drawn from the
uniform distribution over the set of feasible allocations for the coalition). Another example is
a house allocation problem with pairwise trade: Assumption 1 is satisfied if a pair of players,
whenever they meet, always propose to exchange their houses.
We assume that agents’ utilities are subject to random shocks, so that agent i’s utility is given
by
vi(zi) = ui(zi) + ηi(zi), (1)
where ui(zi) and ηi(zi) stand for the intrinsic utility derived from the bundle zi and noise,
respectively. We assume that, when coalition S is formed, they adopt a (myopic) unanim-
ity rule: when allocation z0S is proposed instead of zS , it is adopted if and only if ∀i ∈ S,
ui(z
0
i)+ηi(z
0
i) ≥ ui(zi)+ηi(zi), with a strict inequality for at least one agent. We assume that the
noise term has the following distribution.
Assumption 2 The noise term is independently distributed over time and across agents according
to the type I extreme value distribution (or Gumbel distribution) with precision parameter βi > 0,
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whose cumulative distribution function Fi is given by
Fi(x) = exp(− exp(−βix− γi)), (2)
where γi is a constant so that the resulting mean equals zero.
Note that agent i’s preferences over z0i and zi depend on random variable ηi(z
0
i) − ηi(zi), and
the above assumption basically implies that it has a bell-shaped distribution which is quite similar
to normal distribution. When the noise term ηi(zi) is distributed according to (2), it is known
that the probability that agent i agrees to receive z0i in exchange for zi is given by
Pr(vi(z
0
i) > vi(zi)) =
exp[βiui(z
0
i)]
exp[βiui(z
0
i)] + exp[βiui(zi)]
. (3)
From this formula it can be seen that, as βi → ∞, noise vanishes and the agent maximizes ui
without any error. That is,
lim
βi→∞
Pr(vi(z0i) > vi(zi)) =



1 if ui(z0i) > ui(zi)
1/2 if ui(z0i) = ui(zi)
0 if ui(z0i) < ui(zi)
This distributional assumption is what is behind the logit model in econometrics in econometrics.
The above description defines a Markov process on the set of feasible allocations of the economy.
At every period, the economy can transit from one allocation to another and, since we assumed
that it is always possible to go from any allocation to any other through a finite sequence of
feasible reallocations, the resulting Markov process is irreducible. Moreover, there is a chance that
the state does not change, which makes the process aperiodic. For such a process, there is a
unique stationary distribution with the following two properties. Firstly, starting from any initial
allocation, the probability distribution on period t allocations is known to approach that stationary
distribution as t → ∞. Secondly, the stationary distribution also represents the proportion of
time spent on each state over an infinite time horizon. Our first result characterizes this stationary
distribution.
Proposition 1 In the barter model with random utility, the stationary distribution over the set
of allocations is given by
µ(z) =
exp
P
i∈N βiui(zi)P
z0∈Z exp
P
i∈N βiui(z
0
i)
.
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Before we present the proof, a few remarks are in order. First, the denominator is a normalizing
constant, common to all z, to ensure that
P
z∈Z µ(z) = 1, so that only the numerator contains
relevant information. The formula tells us that the stationary distribution is “exponentially
proportional” to the social welfare function
P
i∈N βiui(zi). In particular, the most likely states
(for any level of noise) are the ones that maximize that social welfare. Second, recall that βi is
the precision parameter of agent i’s noise term, meaning that a larger βi implies a smaller level of
noise. The formula is easiest to understand when we regard the noise term as the representation
of mistakes; an agent who makes fewer mistakes (i.e., who has a higher βi) has a higher weight in
the long run distribution, all other things equal. That is, changes in his utility level have a bigger
effect on the long run prediction of the model. Third, the stationary distribution is independent of
the matching probabilities, represented by q(s). Suppose that we have two players with identical
utility functions and precision parameters, and assume that one has more opportunities to trade
than the other. Although one might expect that the one with more opportunities to trade does
better than the other, in the long run they receive the same payoff distribution.
Proof. Let Pr(z, z0) be the transition probability from z to z0. It is enough to show that
µ(z) Pr(z, z0) = µ(z0) Pr(z0, z) ∀z, z0 ∈ Z. (4)
To see that this is sufficient, note that by summing both sides over all z0 ∈ Z we get
µ(z) =
X
z0∈Z
µ(z0) Pr(z0, z) ∀z ∈ Z,
which means that µ is a stationary distribution. Equation (4) is what is known as the detailed
balance condition, and it says that the probability inflows and outflows are balanced for any pair
of states. Our symmetric proposal assumption 1 implies Pr(z, z0) = 0⇔ Pr(z0, z) = 0, so that (4)
is satisfied in such a case. In the remaining case, the closed form formula of µ(z) implies that the
detailed balance condition is satisfied if
exp
P
i∈S0 βiui(zi)
exp
P
i∈S0 βiui(z
0
i)
=
Pr(z0, z)
Pr(z, z0)
, (5)
where S0 ≡ {i ∈ N | z0i 6= zi} is the set of agents who have different bundles at z and z0. Now
let us calculate the transition probabilities Pr(z, z0) and Pr(z0, z). Let S0 ≡ {S ∈ S |S0 ⊂ S} be
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the set of feasible coalitions containing S0. Starting with z, the new allocation z0 is obtained if
and only if a coalition S ∈ S0 is selected, proposal z0S is made, and all members of S0 prefer z0i to
zi.3 Recalling that q(S) is the probability that coalition S is selected to make a proposal, and
denoting by rzS (z
0
S) the probability that S proposes z
0
S , we have, using (3),
Pr(z, z0) =
X
S∈S0
q(S)rzS (z
0
S)
Y
i∈S
Pr(vi(z
0
i) > vi(zi))
=
X
S∈S0
q(S)rzS (z
0
S)
exp[
P
i∈S0 βiui(z
0
i)]
H
,
where H =
Q
i∈S0{exp[βiui(z0i)] + exp[βiui(zi)]}. Similarly, we have
Pr(z0, z) =
X
S∈S0
q(S)rz0S (zS)
exp[
P
i∈S0 βiui(zi)]
H
.
By our symmetric proposal assumption 1, we have rzS (z
0
S) = rz0S (zS), and the condition (5) is
satisfied.
Note that the detailed balance equation (4) fails when the proposal distribution does not satisfy
assumption 1, as the proof shows: without this assumption, the clean closed form solution cannot
be obtained.
Thus, Proposition 1 allows one to obtain the exact proportion of time that the system would
spend at each feasible allocation in the long run. Let us now examine how the stationary
distribution changes with the level of noise. For simplicity, consider the symmetric case with
β1 = · · · = βI = β. When the precision parameter of the noise terms β is close to 0, the system
is subject to large random shocks, and the expression in Proposition 1 shows that the stationary
distribution is close to the uniform distribution. As the level of noise decreases (i.e., as β in-
creases), states with higher social welfare
P
i∈N ui(zi) receive higher probabilities. When noise
is vanishing (β → ∞), each term expβ
P
i∈N ui(zi), z ∈ Z diverges to infinity, but the one that
corresponds to the maximizer of the social welfare
P
i∈N ui(zi) does so with the highest speed.
Hence we have the following characterization.
3Agents in S \ S0 are proposed the same bundles as before, so they are indifferent between z0S and zS .
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Corollary 1 In the barter model with random utility, if the noise is symmetric β1 = · · · = βI = β,
then as β → ∞, the limiting stationary distribution places probability 1 on the set of allocations
that maximize the sum of the agents’ intrinsic utility functions.
One can generalize the above corollary as follows: if for all i ∈ N the noise parameter is βi = λiβ
for some λi > 0, then as β → ∞, the limiting stationary distribution places probability 1 on the
set of allocations that maximize the weighted utilitarian social welfare function
P
i∈N λiui(zi).
Remark 1 Note that a monotone increasing transformation of the intrinsic utility functions ui
affects the stationary distribution of the dynamic process. This is so because a transformation of
the intrinsic utility function does affect the random preferences. That is, the stationary distribution
is invariant only to transformations that preserve the random preferences. For example, the
random utility functions vi(zi) = ui(zi) + ηi(zi) and wi(zi) = aui(zi) + aηi(zi) represent the same
random preferences for all a > 0. In fact, letting ξi = aηi we can write wi(zi) = aui(zi)+ξi(zi) and
check that if ηi(zi) is distributed according to the type I extreme value distribution with precision
parameter βi > 0, then ξi(zi) is distributed according to the type I extreme value distribution
with precision parameter βi/a > 0.
Remark 2 Wondering about robustness of our results, we have conducted some numerical simu-
lations for our assumed logit noise and for the normal noise case. In the case of the logit model, the
simulations reveal the dynamic paths in greater detail. The normal case, which does not admit an
analytical solution, yields similar results, although convergence to the efficient allocation appears
to be slower. This may come from the fact that the logit distribution has fatter tails, so that large
shocks are more likely. The interested reader can find more details in Kandori, Serrano and Volij
(2004).
Remark 3 Given a representation (ui)i∈N of the agents’ intrinsic preferences, the way the noise
term is introduced affects the evolution of the allocations, and hence also its long run distribution.
For instance, assume the noise term enters the utility function in the following multiplicative form:
vi(zi) = ui(zi)ξi(zi), (6)
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where ηi(zi) ≡ ln ξi(zi) has type I extreme value distribution with parameter βi. Then we can
repeat the analysis, and by replacing in it ui with lnui, obtain that the stationary distribution µ(z)
is proportional to the weighted Nash social welfare function
Q
i∈N ui(zi)
βi . The two models are
different if there is a cardinal meaning attached to the intrinsic utility (for example, when ui(zi) is
interpreted as a von Neumann-Morgenstern (or Bernoulli) utility function, or the monetary value
of zi in the case where agent i has a quasi-linear utility function).
3 Trade with Money: House Allocation Problems with Side Pay-
ments
We now consider the case where indivisible goods are traded with (divisible) money. While the
barter model of the previous section may be a good approximation of the office allocation in a
department, where no monetary transfers are associated with the office assignment, in order to
describe a housing market it would be more realistic to introduce monetary transfers.
Specifically, we consider an economy with a set H of houses, and a set N of agents. The
number of houses is the same as the number of agents: |H| = |N |. An agent’s consumption bundle
consists of only one house and money. Therefore, a house allocation is an assignment (zi)i∈N of
the houses in H to the agents in N . A typical allocation is an object of the form ((zi,mi))i∈N
such that (zi)i∈N is a house allocation, and for each i ∈ N , mi is agent i’s money holdings, which
for simplicity are allowed to be negative.
Each agent i ∈ N is assumed to have quasi-linear utility:
πi(zi,mi) ≡ vi(zi) +mi = ui(zi) + ηi(zi) +mi. (7)
As before, ηi(zi) is the random component of utility and it is distributed according to the type
I extreme value distribution with precision parameter βi. Here we assume that the agents have
the same parameter: βi = β for all i ∈ N . This turns out to be essential for the analysis in this
section.
For now we only consider bilateral meetings: in each period a pair of agents (i, j) is selected
with probability q(i, j) > 0. At the end of the section we shall discuss the extension of our
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analysis to general exchange economies with money and to a trading process involving coalitions
other than pairs of agents. We consider the following bargaining procedure. Suppose agents i
and j meet, with the current endowments zi and zj . Let p ∈ < be a monetary transfer from i to
j, where i < j. In other words, we follow a convention that p denotes the payment made by the
agent with a lower index, and note that this is without loss of generality, as p can be negative. We
suppose that the matched pair first come up with p randomly, and then choose to trade at that
price if this is mutually beneficial (according to their utilities with realized noise term). More
specifically, let fij(p) be the density of p for pair (i, j). Its support may be a finite interval, which
may vary across different pairs. We assume that this distribution is symmetric: fij(p) = fij(−p).
When i and j meet, first p is realized according to fij(p), and then exchange their current holdings
at price p if and only if
ui(zj) + ηi(zj)− p > ui(zi) + ηi(zi), and (8)
uj(zi) + ηj(zi) + p > uj(zj) + ηj(zj). (9)
Then, as the random utility shocks ηi(zj) and ηi(zi) have extreme value distribution, condition
(8) is satisfied with probability
exp(β(ui(zj)− p))
exp(β(ui(zj)− p)) + exp(βui(zi))
. (10)
Similarly, given the distributional assumption on ηj(zi) and ηj(zj), condition (9) is satisfied with
probability
exp(β(uj(zi) + p))
exp(β(uj(zi) + p)) + exp(βuj(zj))
. (11)
Hence, given p, trade occurs with the product of the above probabilities, which is equal to
exp[β(ui(zj) + uj(zi))]
H(p)
. (12)
Here, H(p) is the product of the denominators of (10) and (11), and it is equal to
H(p) = exp(β(ui(zj) + uj(zi))) + exp(β(ui(zj) + uj(zj)− p)
+ exp(β(ui(zi) + uj(zi) + p) + exp(β(ui(zi) + uj(zj))). (13)
Note that the equality of noise parameters βi = β for all i ∈ N is essential to eliminate p from the
numerator of (12). After trade takes place, i possesses zj and j possesses zi and the monetary
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transfer p takes place from i to j. When these agents meet again, the probability of trade
(to restore the original endowments) given p is obtained by exchanging zi and zj in the above
expressions when the transfer is −p. Namely, the probability of trade is
exp[β(ui(zi) + uj(zj))]
H(−p) . (14)
The above description defines a Markov chain over the set of house allocations. This means that,
despite the presence of the divisible commodity “money,” we can restrict our attention to the
allocation of houses, whose evolution can be described as a Markov chain on a finite state space.
Intuitively, this is due in part to the absence of income effects of the quasi-linear utility: the
preferences over goods, and therefore the law of motion, are not affected by how much income each
agent possesses. In addition, the symmetry of precision parameters and of the price distribution,
along with the trading procedure (in which the determination of the price and the swapping of
houses are not simultaneous) are the other factors that make this possible.
At this juncture, let us make a couple of remarks about our formulation of money. A possible
alternative formulation is to treat money as a medium of exchange to obtain a desirable bundle
zi (a search model a la Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)). There are several reasons why we do not
take such a formulation. Firstly, the search model is most fruitfully analyzed when we assume
forward-looking, rational players, while our focus here is on myopic, boundedly rational agents.
Secondly, it is essential that goods are consumed (or ”eaten”) and produced over time in the
search models. This makes sure that at each moment in time, players have potential demand
for fiat money in order to obtain consumption goods in the future. In contrast, our focus is on
the allocation of durable goods (whose service flow, not the good itself, is consumed) with fixed
supply. In this setting, once a Pareto efficient allocation is reached, there is no intrinsic need for
further exchange, and the demand for the medium of exchange disappears. This circumstance
would make it hard to derive a positive value for fiat money.4
Another possibility is to treat money as one of the durable goods which are traded among
the agents (a component of bundle zi, which enters the utility function ui). This formulation
presupposes that an agent enjoys flow utility from monetary balance even though she does not use
it to purchase goods and services, and we find this rather unrealistic. Instead, we adopt a ”partial
4At least in the benchmark case where agents’ utility is subject to no noise.
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equilibrium” formulation, where the monetary term mi represents the flow utility of monetary
exchanges that lie outside our model of durable goods allocations.
Let us now denote the Markov chain’s stationary distribution by µz. Just like in the barter
model with random utility, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 In the house allocation problem with money, the stationary distribution for the
allocation of houses is given by
µz(z) =
exp
£
β
P
i∈N ui(zi)
¤P
z0∈Z exp
£
β
P
i∈N ui(z
0
i)
¤ .
Proof. Let Pr(z, z0) be the transition probability from state z to z0. Again we will show the
detailed balance condition:
µz(z) Pr(z, z0) = µz(z0) Pr(z0, z). (15)
(Recall that summing both sides over z0 shows that µz is the stationary distribution). To show
(15), it is sufficient to prove that
exp[β
X
k∈N
uk(zk)] Pr(z, z
0) = exp[β
X
k∈N
uk(z
0
k)] Pr(z
0, z). (16)
If z0 cannot be obtained by a pairwise trade from z, then (16) is satisfied because Pr(z, z0) =
Pr(z0, z) = 0. Otherwise, z0 is obtained from z when a pair of agents trade, and let us denote the
pair by (i, j), where i < j. Hence, we have
z0k = zk for k 6= i, j and
z0i = zj and z
0
j = zi. (17)
Then, we have
Pr(z, z0) = q(i, j)
Z ∞
−∞
exp[β(ui(zj) + uj(zi))]
H(p)
fij(p)dp,
where H(p) is given by (13). Recall that q(i, j) is the probability that the pair (i, j) meets, that
given p the exchange occurs with probability (12), and that p is proposed according to density
fij .
Similarly, using (14),
Pr(z0, z) = q(i, j)
Z ∞
−∞
exp[β(ui(zi) + uj(zj))]
H(−p) fij(p)dp.
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By the symmetry assumption on fij(·), i.e., fij(p) = fij(−p), we have
T ≡
Z ∞
−∞
fij(p)
H(p)
dp =
Z ∞
−∞
fij(−p)
H(p)
dp =
Z ∞
−∞
fij(p)
H(−p)dp,
so that
Pr(z, z0) = q(i, j)T exp[β(ui(zj) + uj(zi))],
and
Pr(z0, z) = q(i, j)T exp[β(ui(zi) + uj(zj))].
Hence, the desired condition (16) holds since, using (17), either side of this condition is equal to
q(i, j)T exp
£
β
¡X
k∈N
uk(zk) + ui(zj) + uj(zi)
¢¤
.
Therefore, one obtains the same limiting results as in Corollary 1 as β →∞:
Corollary 2 In the house allocation model with money where the noise is symmetric, β1 = · · · =
βI = β, the limit stationary distribution, as β →∞, places probability 1 on the goods allocation(s)
that maximizes
P
i∈N ui(zi).
The following remarks are in order:
Remark 4 The results can be extended to an exchange economy in which there are K indivisible
goods (apart from money) and where an agent can hold any subset of the indivisible goods. To
do this, as in Section 2, one needs to assume that the proposal distribution in each meeting is
“symmetric.”
Remark 5 The results can also be extended to a process in which coalitions, not only pairs,
trade. To do this, the bargaining procedure played by coalition S begins with the draw of transfers
p = (pi)i∈S that is balanced, i.e.,
P
i∈S pi = 0. One should continue to assume that the transfer
density is symmetric around 0: fS(p) = fS(−p). Then, one can replicate the same steps in the
above proof to reach identical conclusions.
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4 Related Work
Shapley and Scarf (1974) present basic properties of a special case of discrete allocation problems
we considered, known as the house allocation problem, where each agent is assigned exactly one
object. Uzawa (1962) studies a deterministic barter process for divisible goods, in a setting where
the trading process never gets stuck on inefficient states.
Our work generalizes a result due to Ben-Shoham, Serrano and Volij (2004). In that paper, only
pairwise trade in the house allocation problem without money is considered, and the persistent
shocks are “mistakes” in decision-making.5 In particular, they assume that, when an agent has
his kth best house, the probability of accepting her mth best house (m > k) has the order of εm−k,
where ε ∈ (0, 1) is a small number. This is a particular formulation of mistake probabilities, where
more serious mistakes are less likely. They showed that, when the randomness is vanishingly small
(as ε → 0), the allocation that minimizes envy is selected in the long run. Agent i’s envy level
is the number of people who have better houses than agent i (according to i’s preferences). The
envy in the society is the sum of individual agents’ envy levels. The current paper shows that
there is a more general mechanism at work operating behind the Ben-Shoham et al result. First,
we note that their specification of noise can be related to the logit model. Let N be the number of
houses/agents and let us assume that agent i’s utility for her kth best house xi is ui(xi) = N−k+1
(so that the utilities of the N houses are 1, 2, . . . , N , where N is the utility of the best house). A
straightforward calculation shows that we obtain their specification of mistake probabilities, when
we add the logit noise term to this utility function. Second, one can see that the envy is equal toP
i(N − u(xi)), and minimizing this expression is equivalent to maximizing the utilitarian social
welfare
P
i u(xi). We have found that the driving force of their result is that the logit noise model
maximizes the utilitarian social welfare (and this is true for any specifications of utility functions).
Furthermore, we are able to derive the stationary distribution not only when the noise is negligible
but also when the randomness is large. This addresses the concern that it takes a very long time
to see the predictions of stochastic evolutionary models.
5 In another paper, Serrano and Volij (2003) explore coalitional trade; their exchange process is quite different,
though, because it gives a special role to agents’ initial endowments. This leads to connections with Walrasian and
core allocations.
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Several papers have used logit noise in dynamic adjustment processes (see Durlauf (1997) and
the references therein). The most closely related work to ours is Blume (1997), who obtained a
closed form expression of the stationary distribution for any level of noise when the following two
conditions are satisfied: (i) players play a potential game (i.e., each player’s best reply function
is the same as in a game in which players have an identical payoff (“potential”)) and (ii) at each
moment of time, only one player can adjust. Blume (1997) shows that the stationary distribution
under the logit noise is given by
βP (a)P
a0∈A βP (a
0)
,
where P is the potential, A is the set of strategy profiles, and β is the common parameter mea-
suring the level of noise (in contrast to our model, a common β is necessary to derive the closed
form). Young and Burke (2001) and Sandholm (2005) present applications of Blume’s result to the
geographical distribution of agricultural contracts in Illinois and Pigouvian pricing under external-
ities. Our models are different from Blume’s in that they do not satisfy the above two conditions.
The technical contribution of our paper is to show that a similar closed form expression can be
obtained for a wider class of situations, where those conditions are not satisfied.
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